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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
LAWRENCE J. BELL, et al,

)

Plaintiff and

)

Appellant,

)

vs.

]
i

REED A* ELDER, RONALD 0.
)
ELDER and ALLEN G. ELDER,
and the City of Enoch, Ltd.,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

No.

880202-CA

Priority No.: 14b

Defendants and
Respondents.
Appeal from the Judgment of the District Court
of Cache County, State of Utah
Honorable Venoy Christoffersen, Judge
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Judicial Code of the Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3
entitled "Court of Appeals Jurisdiction" states as follows:
(2) "The Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
.... (h) cases transferred to the
Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court."
This appeal is taken from a Judgment rendered in the
District Court of Cache County.

It was transferred to the

Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court, and is therefore
properly before this Court, which has Appellate Jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The Appellants brought an action for breach of contract
against the Respondents, in the First Judicial District Court

of Cache County.
any

recovery,

That Court denied the plaintiffs-appellants
and

granted

Judgment

in

favor

of

the

defendants-respondents.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issues presented by this Appeal are:
1.

Did the Court err as a matter of law in its finding

#8, that the Respondents were not in breach of Contract
because

it was

the Appellant's

responsibility

supplemental agreement to be in a position to put

under

the

water to

beneficial use before the Respondents had a obligation to
perform under their contract.
2.

Did the Court err in its findings #9 that on October

15, 1980 the Respondent's were

in a position to furnish

culinary water to the Appellant's property line pursuant to
the terms of a supplemental agreement to a Uniform

Real

Estate Contract.
3.

Did the Court err in its finding #10 that there was

no value to installing water lines to the property until the
Appellant's could put the water to beneficial use.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In the summer of 1976, the Appellant Larry Bell was a
Captain in the United States Air Force, assigned to Eileson
Air Force Base, in Alaska. At that time the Respondents Reed
and Ronald Elder were in the construction business and had
been the successful

bidders to refurbish the base family

housing

units.

The

Appellants

and

Respondents

became

acquainted through their joint church activities. (T-52)
During this summer Appellants learned that Respondents owned
200 acres in Cache County, Utah which they planned to develop
as

a multi-residential

development.

season the Bell's visited his

During

the holiday

in-laws, Mr. & Mrs. Waldron

in Logan, Utah. Mr. Waldron1s backround included a number of
years as Vice-president of Logan Savings & Loan Association
during which time Logan Savings had several business dealings
with the Elders. (Tr. 188)

Upon learning of the proposed

development from his son-in-law, in January 1977, Mr. Waldron
entered
again

into negotiations with the Elders, who were also
in

Utah,

property.

for

the

purchase

of

ten

acres

of

this

The culmination of those negotiations was Exhibit

1, a Uniform Real Estate Contract, dated February 7, 1977,
which

had

been

sent

to

signature.

(Tr.

189, 190)

contract is the following

Appellants
The

in Alaska

pertinent

for

term

of

their
that

portion of paragraph 11:

"The seller hereby agrees and warrantys
to furnish water and electrical power,
roads to this property by July, 1978. If
Buyer is unable to obtain building permit
by July, 1978 the Seller agrees to
indemnify and repay this contract for six
months".
In the spring of 1977 the respondents undertook the
development

of

the

property

by

retaining

Mr.

Lund,

an

engineer, to do the work needed to obtain

approval from the

Cache

a

county

planning

development. (Tr. 178)

commission

for

planned

unit

The

former

Cache

county

planning

Sizemore and Mr. Lund testified
purchased

by

the

Appellants

director,

Kenneth

that the ten (10) acres

were

part

of

this

overall

development, and the planned source of culinary water for the
development was

a well known as the "Griffin Well".

It is

clear from the testimony of Mr. Sizemore and Mr. Lund that
this was the only planned

source of water

property until November of 1979.

to Appellants

(Tr. 27, 182)

Mr. Sizemore further testified that

in February of 1977

the property purchased by Appellants was zoned agricultural,
and

required a

minimum lot size of 10 acres to build a

single family home.
after July 1978
to

to allow building on half acre lots, subject

approval by the planning commission, and only upon prior

proof
29)

However, zoning regulations were amended

that adequate culinary water was available.

(Tr. 28,

The evidence of this availability of Culinary water

was

an appropriation document from the State Water Engineer.
(Tr. 44,45)
In November of 1978 a supplemental agreement, Exhibit 2,
was executed by the Appellants and Respondents.
the terms of that agreement were

negotiated

Once again
between Mr.

Waldron and the respondents, and subsequently mailed to the
Appellants

for

their

signature.

(Tr. 191, 192) When the

parties signed Exhibit 2, the following changed conditions
existed:

(1)

the respondents had been unable to comply with

the conditions of paragraph 11 of Exhibit 1;
197 8 Cache County zoning regulation changes

(2) The July
were effective

and no building permits were being granted without a showing
by the State Water Engineer that adequate culinary water was
available to the property; and (3) The ten acres purchased
via Exhibit 1 had been divided into two, five acre plots, 5
owned by the Appellants and 5 owned by the Waldrons, as noted
in paragraph 1 of the supplemental agreement.

Paragraph 4 of

that agreement provided that if the sellers are unable to
furnish these utilities, on or before October 15, 1980, the
sellers agree to "indemnify and repay this contract within
six months", ie by April 15, 1980. (Ex. 2)
Mr. Sizemore's testimony also clearly evidences that the
Appellants could not have

obtained a permit to build on

their five

acres at the time the supplemental agreement was

signed

reasons

for

set forth

in his letter

Defendants

exhibit 8, as well as in his testimony (Tr. 31, 32 & 34-35)
Respondent Reed Elder testified
supplemental

contract,

that when he signed the

Respondents

knew:

(1)

That the

original 10 acres were divided into two five acre parcels;
(2)

That Appellant's could not get a building permit for

construction on a five (5) acre parcel, (3)

That respondents

agreement to provide water to those five acre parcels was not
dependent

on the appellants ability to obtain a building

permit. (Tr. 226, 227) He further testified that at the time
the

supplemental

agreement

was

signed,

the

anticipated

source of water for the Appellant's property was a certain
"unnamed spring". (T-158), However at this time, that spring
was not

developed, and the Respondents would have had to

build

a

catch

system

for

the water, provided

a way of

diverting water out of the area, and to have taken the water
from the catch system to the edge of Appellants property.
(T-211, 212). He further

testified that no catch system was

built by Respondents, and none was built at all until
The State Water
Farthingham,

testified

Engineer
about

for
the

Cache
history

County,
of

1983.
Robert

Respondent's

application for water from this unnamed spring, the springs
water flow, and about the beneficial use of this water.
testimony

established

that

an

application

was

His

originally

filed by Respondents in June 1977 to appropriate water of the
unknown

spring

under

application

#25-7169.

In

that

application the Respondents stated that the beneficial use
applied for was for the "irrigating of half an acre, using
the water for one family, five cattle and horses".
to this application,

Pursuant

Respondents were required to put the

water to beneficial use by July, 1980.

Because that had not

been done, the State engineer on July 17, 1980 directed a
letter to the Respondent, Ronald Elder advising him that he
had fourteen (14) days to submit proof on the application or
it would lapse.

(Ex. 9, Tr. 88-90).

Based upon this letter

the Respondent Reed Elder, on July 31, 1980

requested a

reinstatement of extension of time in which to prove up the
application and noted in that request:
"Use has been limited to only pasture
watering due to county holding up our
plans for development for the time. We
plan use still in the future".

The fact that Respondents had not put the water to
beneficial

use

was

supported

by

the

stipulation

of

Respondents counsel that his clients did not have the water
appropriated, and that it was never put to a beneficial use
by the Respondents. (T-93,94)

Subsequently on July 31, 1982

Reed Elder submitted another request for a reinstatement and
a extension of time in which to prove up the application.
(Ex. 11)

Based

upon

the

records

of

the State Water

Engineer, from the date the application was filed in 1977
until July of 1982 nothing had been done by the Respondents
to

develop

the

unknown

spring

to

use

the

water

in

a

beneficial way.
Mr. Farthingham also testified that on October 6, 1987
he tested the adequacy of the water flow from this "unnamed
spring".

On that date the only improvement to the spring was

a collection line system, apparently

constructed in 1983 by

a Ron Foster, running to his home. There was no holding tank
or any other development of this unnamed spring. (Tr. 99)
Mr. Farthingham was unable to adequately drain the system to
measure the spring water flow because as the water drained
from faucets in the home it became turbid. Mrs. Foster who
was present during the test was concerned because she could
not
water.

bathe the children or wash her clothes in the dirty
(Tr. 84)

Mr. Farthingham testified based upon the

test which he was able to conduct, the water flow, measured
out of three taps in the home, was 6.40 gallons per minute,
which meant that the spring was probably flowing less than

that.

His conclusion was that the flow of the unnamed spring

into the Foster home did not comply with the water engineer's
recommendations for culinary water to a household. (Tr. 85)
He also testified that there was no other point of diversion
from the unnamed spring except to the Foster home, and that
it was questionable whether an additional use of the water
for other households could be made. (Tr. 99)

Mr. Farthingham

also testified that if water from the unnamed spring had been
piped to Appellant's property line on October 15, 19 80, and
had been

terminated with a faucet above the ground, this

would have met the requirement for putting the water to a
beneficial use. (Tr. 108)
Steve

Weaver

of

Weaver

Construction

Co.

testified

regarding the construction necessary to bring the water from
the unnamed spring to the Appellant's property line and its
related costs. (Ex. #4)
substantial

His testimony that there had been no

improvements of the water

that of Mr. Farthingham. (Tr. 128, 130)

system

corroborated

He further testified

that a concrete holding tank capable of holding at least 3000
gallons needed to be constructed (Tr. 131) , a 2k inch line
running 2200 feet, would need to be installed at least 4 feet
deep,

(Tr.

130,

excavations

would

131), that
be

required

substantial
due

to

dynamiting
large

rocks

and
and

conglomerated, (Tr. 129), that a pump station was required to
get pressure of at least 40 pounds pressure in the line. (Tr.
132) The

total

cost

for

the project was estimated

to be

$50,700.00, with a total construction time of approximately
30 to 45 days. (Tr. 133, 134)

Jay Griggs, a retired design engineer with the Corp of
Engineers testified

he had purchased

property

from the

Respondents and had built his home on land located above that
owned by Appellants.

In building his home he had been

involved in bringing a water system to his home, and had
constructed his own 2,000 gallon holding tanks for his
system.

He testified that in his opinion the method

type

construction

of

as outlined

and

by Mr. Weaver was the

correct one that was needed to bring water to the Appellant1s
property.

(Tr. 282, 287-289)

He further testified that

the use of explosives would be absolutely essential in the
construction phase, and

that a gravity flow system could not

be established based on the differences in the elevation of
the unnamed spring compared to that of Bell's property, and
the difficulty in insuring an adequate water flow with such a
system at that location. (Tr. 294, 295)

Mr. Griggs further

testified there were no other sources of storage for the
unnamed

spring

facilities

in

water,
the

in

area

that

the

mentioned

two
as

water

storage

potential

storage

sources in Reed Elder's testimony, stored water from other
waters sources,

were owned by

persons or entities other

than Respondents, and no agreements existed granting others
use of their holding tanks. (Tr. 293,294)
In contradiction to the testimony of Mr. Weaver and Mr.
Griggs the Respondent Reed Elder,

testified in support of

the claim that Respondents were always able to furnish
to the

property

line

of the Appellants

pursuant

water
to the

requirements of

Ex. #2.

The essence of the Respondents

position was that had the Appellants requested a building
permit, that the Respondents would have then furnished water
from the unnamed spring to the Appellant's property. (Tr.
167)

That Respondents did not run a water line to the edge

of the property because the water rights would have been lost
after

an

assignment

of

water

had

been

made.

When

cross-examined, regarding the construction needed in October
15, 1980 to bring the water line to the Appellant's property
line, Reed Elder testified that he only would have had to
build lateral drainage lines to a larger source of storage.
(Tr. 169, 170) That the source of the needed water storage
would have been what is called the Nephi commish spring.

He

further testified that the Respondents would have connected
to that storage via a 1 inch line on the road.

Once again

however the Respondent (Tr. 158) testified that he had not
put water from the unnamed spring to a beneficial use as of
November 1978.

That as of October 15, 1980, to provide water

to the Appellant's

property, because
drainage

lines

the

would

spring was not

improved,

lateral

have

installed

to run water into a storage source,

had

to

be

and then a

line parallel and below the west side of the dirt road needed
to be laid to the property.

(Tr. 162, 170)

This of course

supported the opinion of Mr. Weaver that the best way to
construct the water line was along that same road.

The

Respondent also agreed with the testimony of Mr. Weaver and
Mr.

Griggs

that

a

pump

system

needed

to be installed

somewhere

along

the

water

Appellant's property.

line

to

push

the

water

to

With regard to the water line, the

Respondent testified that he felt he might have tried to
connect a line from the storage source to an old 1 inch line
that had previously been laid in the road although he was not
sure if that line was in the ground or

usable. (Tr. 172)

Mr. Griggs' testimony on this issue was that the 1 inch line
was no longer available, and had been partially removed, and
had only been laid along the road to a depth of no more than
11 to 12 inches rather than the four foot depth needed. The
Respondent also acknowledged that a line larger

than a 1

inch line would have to be installed to handle the pumping
difficulties.

Mr. Elder further acknowledged (Tr. 173) that

he did not own or have control over the commish water storage
facility, or

any other water storage facility in the area,

and did not have any written agreements which would allow
him, during any of the period of time in question, the use of
any other water storage facility.

The testimony of Reed

Elder was clear that on October 15, 1980, Respondents had not
put the water from the unnamed spring to beneficial use, had
not perfected the water rights, had not done any improvements
on the unnamed spring including building a storage facility.
(Tr. 231) Mr. Elder on
his

first

discussion

cross-examination also admitted that
about

using

a holding

tank

system

belonging to somebody else for the storage of water from the
unnamed spring
(Tr. 233) .

was not until sometime between 1982 to 1985

The

Appellant,

Larry

Bell

testified

that

he

was

concerned with water being available to the property by the
deadline contained in Exhibit #2 because the property was
essentially

worthless without water.

(Tr. 57)

Mr. Bell

further testified that every year after his separation from
the Air Force in June of 1977, he had discussed with the
Respondent Ron Elder, the status of the watering system. (Tr.
66) He

further testified that after July of 1978, he had

indicated to Ron Elder that he was going to list his property
for sale, and that he needed water to do it.

That after he

had listed the property for sale in September 1981, there had
been several inquiries concerning the property, but because
of the uncertainty of the availability of water it could not
be sold.

(Tr. 67, 68, 134, 143, 147).

Mr. Bell further

testified he had paid $12,500 for the property.
Dr. Lynn Davis, an Agricultural Economist testified that
the value of the property as of the date of trial (October 8,
1987) was $200.00 per acre.

That when purchased the value of

the property without water, etc was $500.00 an acre. (Tr.
204)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I.
The

lower

Court

erred

as

a matter

of

law

in its

determination a condition precedent to Respondents obligation
to

furnish

water

to

the

property

line

was

Appellant's

responsibility under the supplemental agreement to be in a
position to put water to beneficial use.

POINT II,
The lower Court ruled contrary to Utah law in making its
finding that Respondent's were

in a position

to furnish

culinary water to Appellant's property line pursuant to their
obligation under paragraph 4 of the supplemental agreement.
POINT III,
The Court abused its discretion in finding there would
be no value to the Appellant's by the Respondent's installing
water to the property line based upon the evidence before the
Court.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW'
IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT A CONDITION
PRECEDENT TO RESPONDENTS OBLIGATION TO
FURNISH WATER TO THE PROPERTY LINE WAS
APPELLANT'S
RESPONSIBILITY UNDER
THE
SUPPLEMENTAL
AGREEMENT TO BE
IN A
POSITION TO PUT WATER TO BENEFICIAL USE.
In Rapp v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 6 06 P.2d
1189 (Ut. 1980) the Utah Supreme Court held:
"It is well - settled law that the
parties to a contract may, by mutual
consent, alter all or any portion of that
contract by agreement upon a modification
thereof. Where such a modification is
agreed upon, the terms thereof govern the
rights and obligations of the parties
under
the
contract,
and
any
pre-modification contractual rights which
conflict with the terms of the contract
as modified must be deemed waived or
excused."
The issue before the trial Court therefore, dealt with
an

interpretation

of

the

terms

and

conditions

of

the

supplemental agreement and whether

Respondent's breached the

contract by failing to perform according to its terms as
modified.

The Supreme Court In Mark Steel Corp. v. EIMCO

Corp., 548 P.2d 892 (Ut. 1976) f noted that the:
"Primary rule in interpreting a contract
is to determine what the parties intended
by what they said; the Court will not
add, ignore, or discard words in this
process, but will attempt to render
certain the meaning of provisions in
dispute by objective and reasonable
construction of the whole contract."
A determination of whether a breach of contract incurred
in this case must

focus on determining what the parties

intended by the supplemental agreement.

A review of that

agreement and the testimony before the Court clearly reflects
the following:
1.

That the supplemental agreement was intended to be a

modification of the original Uniform Real Estate Contract.
(Ex. 2)
2.

That the supplemental agreement was entered into

because the Respondent's were having difficulty performing
under the original terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract.
(Ex. 2)
3.
plot

had

That the Respondent's knew the original ten acre
been

divided

into

two

five acre plotsf

that

building permits would not be granted for the five acre plots
and with this knowledge, agreed to supply

at their cost

culinary water to the Appellant's five acre plot. (Tr. 226,
227)

4.

Paragraph

4

of

the

supplemental

agreement

specifically provides that if the Respondents were unable to
furnish those utilities on or before October 15, 1980, then
the Appellants would be indemnified and repaid under this
contract within six months from October 15, 1980f

i.e. by

April 15f 1981.
The terms and conditions of Exhibit #1 which were no
longer applicable because by their nature they could not be
when the supplemental agreement was entered into strictly
relate to the provision under paragraph 11.
provisions of paragraph 11 of Exhibit 1

Obviously the

relating to the

buyers obtaining a building permit by July 1978 etc., if
still effective on November 3, 1978 when the supplemental
agreement

was

signed, were

waived

agreement and no longer a condition
Court.

by

the

supplemental

to be considered by the

A review of the other terms of the supplemental

agreement in no way negate the clear language regarding the
Respondents responsibility

and their liability

upon their

breach of the supplemental agreement.
In Land v. Land, 65 P.2d 1248f

(Ut. 1980) the Supreme

Court noted that "where possible, the underlying intent of a
contract is to be gleaned from the language of the instrument
itself; and only where the language is uncertain or ambiguous
need extrinsic evidence be resorted to."
No such ambiguity was claimed to exist in

this case,

nor was any asserted. It is therefore submitted that, as a
matter of law, the trial Court erred in reading into the

language of this supplemental agreement a condition precedent
to

the

Respondents

obligation

to

perform,

namely

the

condition that the Appellant's had to be in a position to put
water

to

beneficial

use

before

obligated

to furnish

water

the

Respondent's

to the property

line

were

of the

Appellant's.

POINT II,
THE LOWER COURT RULED CONTRARY TO UTAH
LAW MAKING ITS FINDING THAT RESPONDENT'S
WERE IN A POSITION TO FURNISH CULINARY
WATER TO
APPELLANT'S PROPERTY LINE
PURSUANT
TO
THEIR
OBLIGATION
UNDER
PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT
A review of the testimony of Mr. Farthingham, and of the
certified copy of file no. 25-7169 from the State Engineer's
officef

relating to the City of Enoch's applications for

water rights from the unnamed spring,
1.

That

on June

6,

1977r

show:
Ron

Elder,

filed an

application to appropriate water for the City of Enoch.
the application

was

for

the diversion of water

That

from an

unnamed spring to be used for the domestic purposes of one
family, stock watering of five cattle and used from April 1
to October 31 for irrigation. (Tr. 79)
2.

Subsequently, on July 17, 1980, a letter was sent to

Ron Elder from the State Engineer advising him that,

the

City of Enoch had not complied with the requirements of the
original application, and such compliance would have to be
made by July 31, 1980, or a request for an extension of time

would

need

to

be filed

to prevent the application from

lapsing. (Ex. 9, R-208)
3.

On July 30, 1980, a request for reinstatement and

extension of time was filed by Reed Elder.

In that request,

he noted that the work to improve the spring had not been
done, and the water had not been put to beneficial use by
July 31, 1980, because:
"The use has been limited to only pasture watering due
to County holding up our plans for development for the
time... ."
The State Engineer
1980,

that

an

notified Ron Elder on August 29,

extension

of

time

for

filing

proof

of

appropriation had been granted until July 31, 1982. (Ex. 10,
R-209)
4.

Again, on May 28, 1982, because proof had not been

submitted that the water had been put to beneficial use, the
State Engineer sent another letter to Ronald Elder.

This

letter, once again, pointed out that there had been a failure
on the part of the Elders to complete any development of the
spring, and noted that the extension application would lapse
unless a new request was filed. (R-10)
5.

That in response to that letter, an additional

request for an extension of time was filed by Reed Elder on
June 7, 1982.

That in that request, the reason stated for

the failure to complete the work of improving the spring, and
putting the water to beneficial use was:
"No further action has been taken since the last
extension.
We are still planning development in the
future." (Ex. 11, R-210)

6.

The State Engineer advised Reed Elder in a July 8,

1982 letter that the time to file a proof of appropriation
was extended to the City of Enoch until July 31, 1985.

A

memorandum decision of the State Engineer accompanied this
letter.

In that memorandum the State Engineer advised the

City of Enoch/Elders that they had not complied with the
provisions of Section 73-3-12, Utah Code Annotated, in that
there was not a proper showing of diligence or reasonable
cause

for

delay

application.
7.

in

proceeding

with

the

proof

on

the

(Emphasis acided) (R-210)

In August of 1982, an additional change application

was filed on behalf of the City of Enoch by Reec3 Elder.
Paragraph 8 of that application provided that the diversion
of the water was to be accomplished by the construction of a
tunnel collection box and a pipeline to the place of use.
The purpose of the application was
families.

(R-211

to include two additional

& 212)

8. Once again, on May 31, 1985, a letter was sent by the
State Engineer to Reed Elder advising him that, as of that
date,

no

proof

of

application

of

the

water

had

been

submitted, and that the proof due date was July 31, 1985.
Thereafter, an election to file water users claim was duly
filed by Reed Elder on behalf of the City of Enoch on July
19, 1985. (R-215)
Based upon the above, it is clear that the defendants
had not taken any steps, or undertaken any construction on
the

unnamed

spring

to

bring

water

to

the

plaintiffs1

property,

nor

had

they

complied with

the

provisions of

§73-3-12 U.C.A. as of May, 1985, let alone as of November,
1980.

Reference is also made to the testimony of Reed Elder,

wherein he confirms he had taken no steps to develop the
spring. (Tr. 231)
In Sowards v, Meacher, 108 P. 1112, 1113, (1910) the
Utah Supreme Court noted:
"To constitute a valid appropriation of
water, there must be: an intent to apply
it to a beneficiary use, a diversion from
a natural channel by a ditch, canal, or
other structure, and an application of it
to a useful industry within a reasonable
time; the last mentioned element being
the most essential."
This case has been followed by other decisions where the
issue was whether
water.

a party

perfected an application for

See Eardley v. Terry, 77 P.2d 363, 365 (1938), where

the Utah Supreme Court also held:
"The approval
or rejection of the
application is simply a preliminary
matter and is not intended to, and does
not, fix the rights of the parties before
the State Engineer in such proceedings...
If the application is approved, then
the applicant must proceed to perfect his
appropriation as provided by law. Until
it is so perfected, he cannot be decreed
or given present rights as under a
completed appropriation. It may be that,
although the application is approved, the
applicant may not be able to perfect his
appropriation. The mere approval of the
application does not assure that an
actual
appropriation
of water
will
result." (emphasis added)
This position was further supported in United States v.
District Court, 238 P.2d 1132 (1951).

In that case, the Utah

Supreme Court again upheld the proposition that:

"The right to appropriate or change the
diversion of use of water is not complete
until the appropriation or change has
actually
occurred,
and
hence
the
applicant cannot establish any rights
under the application and have them
adjudicated at the time the application
is approved by the Court."
It is clear, therefore, that in Utah, the approval of an
application does not grant any ownership interest or right to
the water in the person receiving the application, in this
case, to the Elders, d/b/a City of Enoch.

The testimony

before the Court and certified records of the Water Engineer
clearly establish that one application for an extension of
time was filed prior to November, 1980, and one in 1982.
Also, an application for a change of use was filed by the
Defendants before any steps were taken by them in 1985 to
prove their claim.

The Sowards case clearly states that a

diversion from a natural channel by ditch, canal, or other
structure must

be

accomplished

appropriation of water.

before

there

is a valid

It is, therefore, submitted, that

the Defendants, as a matter of law, did not have a valid
appropriation of water in November of 1980, nor were they in
a position at that time to do so.

Certainly they had no

diversion of the spring from any natural
ditch, canal, or other structure.

channel

by any

It is therefore clear they

were unable to furnish culinary water to the Appellant's
property line on October 15, 1980, or on any reasonable date
thereafter.

POINT III.
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FINDING THERE WOULD BE NO VALUE TO THE
APPELLANT'S
BY
THE
RESPONDENT'S
INSTALLING WATER TO THE PROPERTY LINE
BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT.
The evidence presented to the Court on this issue was
from Larry Bell's testimony that in September of 1981 he had
listed the property for sale with Coleman Realty in Logan,
Utah, but had been unable to sell the property because water
had not been provided to the property.
The only other evidence produced on the issue of value
was that of Dr. Davis who testified that current use of the
property was as

marginal grazing land unfenced, and

water and other amenities.
$200.00 per acre.

without

He placed the current value at

Dr. Davis, on cross-examination, also

testified that the difference in the value of the property if
it had water and services to it, compared to the property
without would be the cost of actually
bringing

those

utilities

to

the

property.

(Tr. 207)

Therefore based upon Mr. Weaver's testimony about the cost of
the

construction to bring the water to the property, $50,700

would be reasonable.
Based upon the above uncontradicted evidence,

it is

clear that the Court abused its discretion in finding that
there would have been no value to the Appellants by requiring
Respondents

to

furnish

the

water

to

pursuant to the supplemental agreement.

the

property

line

CONCLUSION
The

Appellant's

seek

reversal

Findings of Fact and Judgment.

of

the

trial

They request that this Court

as a matter of law render its interpretation of the
of

the

supplemental

Court's

agreement,

and

determine

language
that

Respondents were required, at their expense, to

the

furnish

culinary water to Appellant's property on or before October
15, 1980, and that their obligation

was not subject to any

condition being imposed on the Appellants.
Appellant's further request that this Court, based upon
the evidence, determine that both as a matter of law and
factually Respondent's were unable to furnish culinary water
to the property line of the Appellants pursuant to the terms
of

the

supplemental

agreement, and therefore

reverse the

Judgment of the lower Court and find that the Respondents
were in breach of this contract.

Further, while it would

appear that the lower Court was involved in an "indulgence of
paternalism" warned against by the Supreme Court in Park
Valley Corp. v. Bagley, 635 P.2d 65 (Ut. 1981) the Appellant
should be awarded Judgment based upon the evidence for the
$12,500.00 they originally paid for the property, together
with applicable interest thereon, their costs, and reasonable
attorney's

fees

as

provided

by

the Uniform

Real

Estate

Contract.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s _ $ > ^ d a y of July, 1988.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this £rff
mailed four

day of July, 1988, I

(4) true and correct copies of the above and

foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT by placing same in the U.S. Mail
postage prepaid and addressed to the following:
Kevin E. Kane
Attorney for Respondent
108 N. Main
Logan, Utah 84321

^KEITfi
"Attorney for Appellant

